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LAND PLANNING AND DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES
James S. Savage*
Introduction: The Land-Oriented Society
The common law of England that we received in this country at the end
of the eighteenth century was land oriented, affording great protection to
land-owners - a not surprising development in the light of English history.
Though nineteenth-century American jurists were presented with problems
that would have seemed strange and unfamiliar to their English colleagues -
thus affording them a chance to be more creative - they, like their English
brethren, were, and perhaps still are, reluctant to change this basic predilec-
tion of the law. Until the start of the twentieth century, it was a generally ac-
cepted notion both in England and in this country that government which
exercises the least control over the lives of its citizens is the best government,
a view which was certainly compatible with the land-orientation of English
and early-American common law and legislation. The new century offered
a more receptive climate to the doctrine that it is possible, and even desirable,
to determine goals in a democracy and to plan governmental action so as to
achieve them.'
A land-oriented society, if it is going to consider planning as a feasible
thing at all, will entertain the possibility of planning land use. These may be
very simple things at first, limited plans to accomplish a specific purpose such
as early laws designed to reduce the fire hazards in crowded tenements.' In
time it becomes apparent that a number of purposes can and should be
achieved by planning on a more comprehensive scale. Planning of this sort
was first introduced in this country in 1916 by a New York City zoning
ordinance which, among other things, set out residential and business dis-
tricts.' The New York Court of Appeals affirmed the action of the city,' and
in 1926 when the United States Supreme Court gave its approval 5 to a similar
plan, any basic constitutional objection to land-use, in the nature of compre-
hensive zoning at least, seemed resolved in its favor.
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
1 It is entirely possible that this doctrine received a more favorable welcome in England than in
the United States. Late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-century political leaders in England had been
influenced to a considerable degree by Jeremy Bentham and his doctrine of reform through legislation.
Evma-r, Bentham in the United States of America, in JEREMY BENTHAM AND THE LAW 185, 199
(1948). However, a discussion of planning in England is not within the scope of this discussion.
2 1 ME=ZENAuM, THE LAw oF ZoNrNG 7 (1955).
3 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 299 N.Y. 313, 128 N.E. 209 (1920). See N.Y. GEN.
Crry LAw §§ 20 (24), (25).
4 Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., supra note 3; Biggs v. Steinway & Sons, 229 N.Y.
320, 128 N.E. 211 (1920). See also Wulfsohn v. Burden, 241 N.Y. 288, 150 N.E. 120 (1955).
5 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
6 Id. at 397.
(65)
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The Court said:
Under these circumstances, therefore, it is enough for us to determine,
as we do, that the ordinance in its general scope and dominant features,
so far as its provisions are here involved, is a valid exercise of authority,
leaving other provisions to be dealt with as cases arise directly involv-
ing them.6
It should be noted, however, that certainly not all conceivable constitutional
problems had been solved. Nevertheless, by the middle of the present cen-
tury, planning for land use had become an accepted part of municipal law. 7
I. DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES
One of the most provocative and recent statements in this area has been
put forward by Norman Williams, Jr., Director of the Division of Planning,
Department of City Planning, New York City. In an article entitled "Planning
Law and Democratic Living,"8 Mr. Williams asserts that comprehensive land
planning should be recognized not only for the physical, geographical and
civic reasons now motivating most communities, but also for the purpose of
breaking down racial, ethnic, and economic barriers to the end that demo-
cratic living - at least as Mr. Williams understands it with a connotation of
equality without regard to background or economic position - can not only
be achieved but must be achieved in order to keep a democratic government
alive and strong. In his desire for more planning Mr. Williams has company,
as reference to the current literature on the subject would seem to indicate,
but all may not be willing to travel along the planned road to achieve the
goals Mr. Williams has in mind.9
Though democratic purposes are not the same to everyone, most would
agree that they include some broad generalizations about liberty, freedom,
justice and equality, just as most would agree that the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the Bill of Rights express the common purpose to achieve these
democratic ends. However, attainment of democratic purposes is not an easy
matter; historically the people in this country have felt that education, reli-
gion, and morality offered the best hope. When private citizens, or the
government of the state or nation, appeared ready to defeat the attainment
of democratic purposes, the citizenry seemed inclined to put faith in a vigilant
judiciary or sometimes even in self-help. It did not appear to people in the
last century that positive governmental action could achieve democratic
7 1 MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1.118 (1939). Current interest in the problem is
reflected in the curricula of some major law schools now offering courses or seminars in land plan-
ning: University of Chicago Law School; Northwestern University School of Law; Indiana University
School of Law; Harvard Law School; Valparaiso University School of Law. For the most detailed
modem statement of the problem, see Symposium - Land Planning in a Democracy, 20 LAW & CoN-
TEMP. PROB. 197 (1955).
8 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 317 (1955).
9 See HAAR, LAND PLANNING LAW IN A FREE SOCIETY (1951); Kramer, Values in Land Use Con-
trols: Some Problems, 7 Am. U.L. Ray. 1 (1958); Sullivan, Administrative Procedure and the Advo-
catory Process in Urban Redevelopment, 45 CAL. L. Rav. 134 (1957); Symposium - Metropolitan
Regionalism, 105 U. PA. L. RaV. 439 (1957); Symposium - Area Development, 28 RocKY MT. L.
REv. 453 (1956); McDougal, The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions
Relating to Property, 4 J. PUB. L. 93 (1955); Stone, The Myths of Planning and Laissez Faire: A Re-
Orientation, 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1 (1949).
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purposes. It does not seem that way to some people at the present time. When,
therefore, someone suggests land planning for the achievement of democratic
purposes, and when land planning itself takes on this ambitious project, it
would seem that it offers an opportunity to evaluate the function of positive
governmental planning in all areas as a device to implement the purposes
thought to be essential to democratic living.
When a small homogeneous group becomes a large hetrogeneous group,
all of the problems of group living are so magnified and complex that in
many cases they have required entirely new machinery to handle them. Until
the start of the twentieth century most social problems were handled either by
courts or by legislatures and pretty much after the problem had arisen. After
all, the common law has always come into a situation that has already been
created, and the pattern or theory of legislation in the area preceding the
current century was more one of correction than of prevention. We are now
faced with a proposition which says that some, perhaps all, of our social
problems can, by planning, be avoided, simplified, or the effects made less
severe, and all in advance. Land planning offers, in microcosm, an oppor-
tunity to gauge strong points as well as pitfalls, for planning in many more
areas of living may well be just around the corner.
H. PHILOSOPHICAL GUIDELINES
It would be helpful in considering the objective of achieving democratic
living by affirmative land planning if there were some philosophical guide-
lines. The important social historians, the political philosophers, the ethical
philosophers, and the legal philosophers of an earlier time who supplied
much of the theoretical guidance in the development of our democracy and
society had little or nothing to say about democracy and planning, let alone
democracy and land planning. This is understandable enough on the basis
of modernity alone.1" The current group of scholars is only just now con-
cerning itself with this subject; their expressed opinions, though thoughtful,
are in many respects inconclusive. 1
It would also be helpful if land planning had been the subject of debate
and controversy in this country, for then it would be a matter of common
concern; it would be possible to ascertain some general common consensus
as to its propriety, necessity, or desirability. Few people have an interest in
land planning unless it is planning of the sort that stimulates th6 imagination
such as the Tennessee Valley Authority or similar large and dramatic illus-
trations. Persons with property interests invaded or threatened may find that
they have a greater stake in zoning than they had previously realized. The
same is true with respect to planning, if this term is used to include govern-
mental action designed to protect existing property interests as well as to
10 Metzenbaum, The History of Zoning - "A Thumbnail Sketch," 9 W. REs. L. REv. 36 (1957).
11 Kramer, Values in Land Use Controls: Some Problems, 7 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1958); McDougal,
The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions Relating to Property, 4 3. P B. L.
93 (1955); Stone, The Myths of Planning and Laissez Faire: A Re-Orientation, 1S GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 1 (1949).
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further public purposes. A neighbor's attempt to turn a garage into a photo-
graphic studio may harm a man's existing interest in his residence, but a
determination by the planners of his community that land adjacent to his
would be suitable for a community recreational area may be just as harmful.
But in general, there is no indication of a common attitude on the subject of
planning. This lack of interest is, of course, always a matter of difficulty in
a democracy. As Barbara Wootton has said,
Everybody knows that the democratic procedure works best when
the questions to be settled are within the everyday experience of those
to whom they are referred, and when those who elect understand the
business entrusted to those who are elected. 12
Land planning as a consequence lacks, on the one hand, philosophical
guidance, and, on the other hand, popular directives from the persons most
concerned.
If it is true that the thought and action of a society - the more or less
collectively-arrived-at consensus of the community - is a reflection of the
philosophical thinking of a preceding day, then it should be helpful to exa-
mine some middle and late-nineteenth century views on democratic living.
These views - although certainly not made applicable to land planning by
their authors - have provided some of the spadework of modern attempts
to achieve democratic purposes through the use of land planning..
James Bryce in his Modern Democracies has stated in his general con-
clusion that the modern experiment in popular government had justified
itself.' 3 That although no form of government could revolutionize or perfect
human nature, and that all forms of government had their characteristic de-
fects, the defects of democracy had been less ruinous than those of other
forms. 14 Bryce found much to praise in democracy both as a political ex-
pedient for the elimination of suffering, fear, and injustice as well as an agency
for the positive stimulation and cultivation of the cultural lives of individuals. 15
John Stuart Mill argued that democracy's superior virtue is the fact that
it calls into activity the intelligence and character of ordinary men and
women. 16 That in order to best do this it is necessary to afford to ordinary
men and women considerable liberty. Many Americans would accept this as
a starting point in any discussion of democracy and in the pre-planning era
this was certainly the dominant theme in political theory. Liberty, Mill asserts,
"... . requires liberty of tastes and pursuits; of framing the plan of our life
to suit our own character; of doing as we like, subject to such consequences
as may follow; without impediment from our fellow-creatures, so long as what
we do does not harm them, even though they should think our condubt foolish,
perverse, or wrong."' 7
When an individual attempts to exercise his "liberty" to work, however,
he may meet governmental interference in the direct form of restrictive quali-
12 WOOTTON, FREEDOM UNDER PLANNING 164 (1945).
13 2 BRYCE, MODERN DEmocRAcuss 527-609 (1921).
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Miil, On Liberty, in 43 GREAT BooKs OF THE WESTERN WORLD 267 (Hutchins ed. 1952).
17 Id. at 273.
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fications, as in law or medicine. On the other hand, when he wishes to exercise
his liberty of living wherever he wants in the United States, it would seem
that governmental restraint is normally absent. Thus, no state can keep resi-
dents of other states from entering and becoming citizens. 8 During the
thirties some states made efforts to keep out persons whom they thought
possessed the potential of becoming objects of public charity, but this action
was quickly struck down,19 and in general the freedom to migrate has been
an accepted liberty. But even though a man is free to move from state to
state or city to city, is he also free to move from place to place within the
confines of the community without legal restriction? Until somewhat recently
- until the dawn of the planning era - the answer had been yes, if he
could supply the necessary money to purchase in the open market. A man
who lived on the wrong side of the tracks could, if he was able to garner the
necessary money, move across the tracks with the blessings of the community,
provided he were white and gentile. No one at that time considered that land
planning was, or should be, anything more than dividing the city into resi-
dential and business district, much less a positive vehicle for eliminating
racial or religious segregation or discrimination.
This particular approach to liberty of action had dominated much of
the thinking in the American communities and most, if not all, of the geogra-
phy of our cities and towns was determined by this theory. It did produce
some spectacular results (magnificent residential areas for example) and
some pretty unfortunate ones (where residential areas were vacated and
allowed to become tenements) as any cursory inspection of urban America
will reveal.
III. SELF-PROTECTION
The restrictions that were imposed in pre-planning days were for the
protection" of existing property interests. Restrictions of this sort - e.g., to
keep an industry from invading a residential district - were not in those
times the subject of too much general concern. The "American Credo" pro-
vided that everyone had an opportunity to acquire property interests as a
result of hard work, thrift, and careful stewardship, and anyone who acquired
property would value the very restrictions that insured the widest freedom of
use to owners. Free speech, free press, free assembly, and free worship were,
and still are, touchy matters in this country and any law or governmental
action curbing them brought immediate response. When, however, it came
to something like the yet-undefined rights in such things as a job, or where
one could live, or how much (or of what quality) one could eat, it did not in
those days seem to many persons that these were "significant" rights. The
deprivation of these "rights" were facts of life and were accepted as such.
It was assumed that the government (federal, state, or local) would interfere
when these matters got out of hand, when destitution or death loomed as the
18 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.19 Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
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only remaining solution, so that food and clothing and housing were furnished
on a desperation basis. There were dissenters from this proposition - some
of them quite articulate - but in general it was accepted.
Even prior to the first attempt at comprehensive zoning, another of
Mill's ideas had come to be generally accepted.
• . . to assert one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely
the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and
control, whether the means used by physical force in the form of legal
penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion. That principle is,
that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their num-
ber, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or
moral, is not a sufficient warrant.20
In community areas where the prosperous were busy building nice
residential neighborhoods it seemed to them that this dictum of Mill's was
especially pertinent. Even as they sat back to enjoy the fruits of their
industriousness and thrift they never quite managed to overcome a concern
over two things: one of their neighbors might sell his property to an "unde-
sirable," or a businessman might well decide that that particular area of the
community would be ideal for a business establishment. What made this
particularly worrisome was the fact that the legal remedies to avoid or restore
were cumbersome and expensive. As to the first problem, adjacent land-
owners might agree among themselves, and their successors, that they would
use, or not use, their land in a certain manner, or that they would not sell or
permit "undesirables" to own the property.2' In order for a private agreement
of this sort to be truly effective, however, it must be susceptible of judicial
enforcement.22 As to the second problem, landowners faced with a threatened
or actual industrial invasion may be able to establish the commission of a
common-law nuisance and receive either financial remuneration by way of
damages, or an injunction to prevent it from happening.2 3 Both of these
remedies depend on factors that make them something less than perfect: (1)
going to court is almost always a time-consuming process which means that
the private agreement, now in breach, or the alleged nuisance, may continue
for some time resulting perhaps in an increased depreciation in value, and
(2) the level of prediction in the common law, always a variable, is certainly
not high when it comes to the definition of a nuisance, and the outcome is
speculative at best; while in the breach-of-contract case the determination of
adequate damages is troublesome and unpredictable, (3) going to court is
expensive whether the claimant wins or loses, (4) the piecemeal results that
flow from a series of judicial decisions, decided after the alleged wrong has
occurred, would not lead to a uniform general plan.
20 MiLL, op. cit. supra note 16, at 271.
21 McDougal, The Influence of the Metropolis on Concepts, Rules and Institutions Relating to
Property, 4 J. PuB. L. 93, 113 (1955).
22 But see Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), holding that such private agreements, though
valid, are unenforceable, when based on racial discrimination.
23 Id. at 112.
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IV. AFFIRMATIVE PLANNING
Because these fears were so often well-grounded, there came among those
concerned, principally residential property owners and city officials, general
acceptance of the doctrine that the problem of land use must be handled as
an exercise of the police power of the state and handled, as far as possible,
in advance. Only by permitting agencies of the state to do some limited
planning (for that is all that was contemplated initially) and, more important,
to enforce the planning, would it be possible to protect property interests.
Thus, there evolved the restrictive-type zoning ordinance that has become the
common pattern in almost all American communities today.
In the thirties the American Credo started to take on a new meaning, a
meaning that is not as yet completely defined. The proposition that intellec-
tual, political, and moral freedoms were the only "significant" ones was
challenged from many sides. It hardly seems necessary to review the develop-
ments that led to the now fairly general acceptance of the thought that man
needs economic protection as well. If the thirties did nothing else, they
created a climate favorable to the rejection of the notion that of all the vari-
ous economic interests of man, only the vested property interest is worthy
of protection. At the time when a substantial number of people did not have
such property interests, as the old English-American law defined property,
there gradually came into existence a recognition that a man might have,
as his only economic or property interest, his job, his freedom from injury,
his freedom from illness, and his freedom from the infirmities of old age.
Out of this realization came legislation in the field of labor relations, com-
pensation for employment injuries, compensation during periods of unem-
ployment, old age protection, and the regulation of working conditions, to
cite only a few examples. The unplanned operation of the market place did
not suffice to cover these situations. As early as 1915 Mr. Justice Brandeis
was noting this trend on the part of American courts.
Political as well as economic and social science noted these rev-
olutionary changes. But legal science - the unwritten or judge-made
laws as distinguished from legislation - was largely deaf and blind to
them. Courts continued to ignore newly arisen social needs. They ap-
plied complacently eighteenth-century conceptions of the liberty of the
individual and of the sacredness of private property. Early nineteenth-
century scientific half-truths, like 'The survival of the fittest,' which,
translated into practice, meant 'The devil take the hindmost,' were
erected by judicial sanction into a moral law.24
This change in the notion of the proper function of government did
not go unnoticed by the land planners. The transition from a theory regard-
ing man as a free individual, economically speaking, to a view placing
him in his economic context and taking affirmative steps to bring about
results thought to be desirable for him, had its effect on planners. This, as
Brandeis called it, "clamor for social justice,"25 could not help but influence
land planning.
24 BwNDEis, THE CuRsE OF BiNESS 318-19 (1915).
25 KONEFSKY, THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEis 81 (1956).
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Mill's dictum about self-protection, which was the original raison d'itre
of zoning, became inadequate in the eyes of some planners, although cer-
tainly not all planners. Bryce's ". . . agency for the positive stimulation.. .,
seemed more appropriate. The early land planners however were not so
much concerned to put man into an economic context as to put him into
a geographic and civic one, to regard him as a user of schools and
churches, of streets, of utilities, and even as a potential fire hazard; in short,
to promote efficient and inexpensive living. This in itself was a step away
from the negative, self-protective thinking of the past. Mr. Horack and Mr.
Nolan say:
Although the early cases placed great emphasis upon the power to
regulate land use for the protection of the individual - particularly,
the residential use of land - the current emphasis is to justify land
use control not for the protection of the individual but for the bene-
fit of the entire community. Thus, Walter Blucher points out that:
' . . . As time goes on, however, and as the zoning process has been
refined, it becomes increasingly important that the zoning ordinance
be used as one of the tools to give effect to a community plan ...
Through the zoning ordinance affecting private property, you can
help carry out a plan without paying any compensation, but to be
really effective it must be a positive and affirmative document, rather
than a negative document.' 27
This change in attitude with respect to the ends to be accomplished
by zoning ordinances, an observable, historical change, is a reflection of
the greater evolution in the philosophy of land planners - and this change
seems to be the heart of the matter. The shift from a negative approach,
protecting only vested property rights, to a positive approach fostering new
economic rights, means that, of necessity, there will be more and more re-
strictions on individual liberties for the general good. Since the common
good is not readily discernable, it means that some one or some political
body will have to direct affirmatively and execute an expanding definition
of the common good in the future. Though it is conceivable that democratic
purposes could be achieved by private agreements, 28 the bulk of the affirm-
ative planning must be done by officers of the executive branch of the gov-
ernment acting under necessarily broad and vague standards.
If the present-day planners, like their immediate forebearers, are content
to think of man in terms of geographic and physical contexts, will they and
26 2 BRYcE, op. cit. supra note 13.
27 HORACK AND NOLAN, LAND UsE CONTROLs 64 (1955).
28 The contracting parties could desire a certain result thought by them to be compatible with
democratic living. A lending institution could finance a housing project and require the owner to
offer his housing without regard to race or creed. The owner-builder would have to accept financial
aid on this basis or reject it from this particular institution. The repayment schedule may make it
imperative that economic equality not be granted to the occupants. This method of achieving some
democratic purposes by private agreement would seem to afford the most individual liberty of choice
to contracting parties. One of the difficulties with this theory of affirmative planning on a private-
contract basis is that, in the last analysis, these contracts may have to be submitted to a court for
interpretation and enforcement It has been noted already that courts are in no position to do long-
range planning and it may be difficult for a court to fit the particular agreement into existing con-
cepts of law, and to do this in a law suit that may well present the usual panoply of procedural
problems, matters of evidence, and all the problems normally associated with a breach-of-contract
action. All this may make the use of such contracts a limited one.
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their successors, in the light of the changing trend, remain content with this
alone? When once it is conceded that the future growth of both urban and rur-
al areas should be planned to produce cities and areas free of traffic dangers
and congestions, free of physical dangers and nuisances, free of moral haz-
ards, and offering light, air, space, and even aesthetics, -9 is it axiomatic
that then it may be necessary to go further and insure to everyone in the
community not just an equal opportunity, but an equal place? Attempting
to afford this economic equality may make for a dead-level mediocrity
that can in its own way be harmful to a democracy.
If this becomes the objective, then it is going to present some new
issues. It has been established that efforts to afford self-protection -the
old zoning rationale - must now, if based on race or creed, be done away
with.3 0 But what about what Mr. Williams calls "economic segregation"?3'
Is not zoning based on size and density restrictions, that keep persons, be-
cause of their economic means, out of certain area as invalid as the gov-
ernmental action designed to keep persons, because of race or creed, out
of a given area?32
Is there, then, an obligation on the planners to eliminate this so-called
economic segregation and plan so that an equal share of the living space
in the community is available to all without regard to economic ability?
To Mr. Williams, these "liberties of living" may be the new civil liberties
of this era. Accordingly, he is disturbed by the restraint of the Supreme
Court in this area, when he says:
What is particularly serious is that in this area the machinery of
democratic government is itself often used successfully for anti-
democratic ends - and that courts, constitutional lawyers, and the
leaders of democratic thought and action remain unconcerned. Thus
in the last few years, the Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to
pass on grave constitutional questions arising in connection with
regulation of the physical and social environment. The regulations
involved in such cases have included: the exclusion of Negroes from
a redevelopment project which had had the benefit of public do-
nation of about 20 per cent of the site, eminent domain to obtain
the rest of the site, and partial tax exemption; a requirement of three
acres of land for all homes built in a given district; a mininmum
building-size regulation (varying according to the number of stories
and the presence or absence of an attached garage) which applied
uniformly throughout an area of some 25 square miles, and which
would apparently exclude about 70 per cent of the population from
buying permanent new houses in such area; the exclusion of Negroes
from previously built public housing projects; the exclusion of churches
from residential districts; and the restrictions in the alien land laws
on land ownership by Japanese-Americans. 33
29 Note, Esthetic Zoning - The Trend of the Law, 7 W. lRns. L. RLv. 171 (1956); 3 VrLL. L. Rnv.
117 (1957).
30 Shelley v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
31 Williams, supra note 8 at 343.
32 Ibid.
33 Id. at 349.
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Mr. Williams asserts that "it is a major premise of American democ-
racy that familiarity, at least in the context of economic security and de-
cent living conditions, breeds not contempt but mutual respect. ' 34 He con-
tends that current developments "are tending to reduce the opportunities
for those regular contacts which may result in spontaneous familiarity be-
tween different racial, ethnic, and economic groups," and he believes that
this has an ominous implication for the future of democracy. 35 In short,
Williams sees planning as an affirmative proposition that contains an im-
perative to plan and promote a general doctrine of state interference for the
good of everyone, although he does not spell out how planners are neces-
sarily to recognize what is good for everyone.36
What will happen if this affirmative governmental control over de-
velopment of physical and social environments comes to pass? What if the
planning does not work so well to accomplish democratic living? Persons
not in sympathy with planning, or persons governed entirely by self-inter-
est, may obstruct such a development of the community by their refusal
to sell land, or buildings, or their labor, for racial, religious, or even eco-
nomic reasons. The sanctions and penalties existing in present-day zon-
ing and planning are not thoroughly effective.
Seldom, except in the larger more impersonal metropolitan areas is
either remedy (fine, imprisonment, or injunction) used. The owner
is not considered a criminal and the cost of remodeling or remov-
ing structures seems confiscatory; therefore public support for such
action is lacking and prosecution becomes politically inexpedient.
Compliance with the ordinance thus is usually voluntary rather than
a matter of official enforcement. 37
If planning becomes completely affirmative and "democratic" how
will these sanctions, now mostly ineffective, work? Once the economically
restrictive zoning laws are removed, if a man cannot live where he wants
to live at a price that he is able to pay, because of private restrictions, then
are his constitutional rights being invaded and, if so, how will we afford
him protection? Will it become necessary to have such a complex of laws,
regulations, inspections, and administrative tribunals to see to it that these
rights are not infringed? If this becomes necessary, then is it not possible
that planning will become so expensive that we shall have to forego it entirely?
Comprehensive planning of the type envisioned by Mr. Williams re-
quires so many controls to prevent evasion that in the end the socialist
prophecy may be fulfilled, that planning without government ownership is
impracticable. This would mean government ownership of land, of build-
ings, and at least complete domination of the building trades. At the pres-
ent stage of American political thought it is more likely that planning will
founder on the rocks of private vested interests or be wrecked by the ex-
ploitation of concentrated governmental powers.
34 Id. at 348.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 HoRAcK AND NOLAN, op cit. supra note 27.
LAND PLANNING AND DEMOCRATIC PURPOSES
Mr. Williams' position with regard to comprehensive land planning
can be summarized as follows:
It has not been generally realized that in many instances the prob-
lems arising in this field of constitutional law are closely akin to those
involved in civil liberties law, and call for similar attitudes toward
the exercise of governmental power.
... What is needed is a conscious over-all strategy for integra-
tion into a more democratic society. Such a strategy would be con-
cerned with analyzing, understanding, and guiding action in wide
areas of American life - in fact, everything connected with the de-
velopment of the physical and social environment, with special em-
phasis on planning and housing and relevant fields of law.38 (Em-
phasis added)
Such a position has not been without its critics. Mr. Julius Stone,
prominent Australian lawyer, law teacher, and legal philosopher, and co-
author of Law and Society39, states the argument against all total planning
without necessarily committing himself to one side or the other.40 Three
of the arguments against planning coincide, almost perfectly, with Mr. Wil-
liams' last quoted statement of the case for comprehensive planning. Mr.
Williams says, "analyzing," and Mr. Stone, in what he calls "The Argument of
Ignorance," says, ".... that the kind of knowledge which is available to social
scientists is not the kind of knowledge on which action can safely or ef-
fectively be taken to affect the social complex as a whole."
'4 1
With regard to Mr. Williams' term, "understanding," Mr. Stone sets
out the argument which he calls "The Argument of Conflict, Confusion and
Instability of Objectives." Here, he says,
Its tenor is that no amount of knowledge, and no amount of wise
and enlightened leadership, can authoritatively settle the objectives
which a society should set for itself. We are here, the Argument runs,
in the field of the normative, the field of values; and when the men
and women of a society are divided in the basic values they seek,
no overall planning is possible which will leave the society free.42
With regard to Mr. Williams' term, "guiding," Mr. Stone sets forth
"The Argument of Serfdom."
Planning would inevitably concentrate far more conscious power in
the hands of the planners than representative institutions, let alone
the electorate, could control. 43
These are strong arguments though negative in character. It is pos-
sible for both approaches to be attractive depending on a great number of
relevant variables. As Robert Kramer said:
Certainly we cannot afford not to have some land planning in a
democracy. But the nature and extent of that planning - its goals
38 Williams, supra note 8 at 350. In this connection, see Note, Is There a Civil Right to Housing
Accommodations? 33 NoRmE D us LAw. 463 (1958).
39 Stone & Simpson, Law and Society (1949).
40 Stone, The Myths of Planning and Laissez Faire: A Re-Orientation, 18 GEo. WAsH. L. Rsv. 1
(1949).
41 Williams, supra note 8, at 350.
42 Stone, supra note 40 at 10.
43 Id. at 8.
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and methods - are still largely unsettled, even though the needs
daily become more urgent.44
V. CONCLUSION
We will continue to have planning because we need it. What safe-
guards, then, can be placed around it so that, on the one hand it does not
drift into socialism nor, on the other, produce such a dead-level medi-
ocrity and nothingness (in the name of democratic living) that a skepticism,
which can so easily lead to some unfortunate (if not fatal) political think-
ing and action, may grow up around the entire process?
There are a number of things that planners can and should keep in
mind:
(1) Planners must, if we are to have democratic living, not forget
that they are planning for indeterminate ends. That in planning for the
present in a democracy, they do not forget that the future may have dif-
ferent goals and objectives. It should not always require a Holmes to point
out that historical continuity is a necessity, not a duty. Planning is a means
to the ends of democracy and not an end itself, and what the ends of plan-
ning may be will change from generation to generation. Or, as Mr. Stone
has put it, planners should not try to do their duty once and for all.45
(2) Who will check the checkers, or plan for the planners? Barbara
Wootton reminds us:
The problem of freedom under planning thus resolves itself in the
end into a circle that can be either vicious or virtuous: it is the citizens
of a wisely planned society who are least likely themselves to fall
victims to the dangers of planning; and vice versa. And all around
that circle it is the responsible, the alert, the active, the informed,
and the confident men and women in the street who hold the key
positions.4 6
(3) Planners must learn to work with "middle principles," or stated
somewhat differently, to learn when to temper principle with expediency
in the light of the social conditions existing in the community. Even Mr.
Williams admits that,
So far as the special (and basic) problem of integrated residential
areas is concerned, tactically it may be wise to concentrate first on
the integration of groups whose differences, cultural or otherwise,
are not too great; .... -47
(4) Planners must use rational methods with those for whose bene-
fit the planning is being carried out. This involves not only having a wise
electorate but in selling the electorate on the propriety of the planning. If
these persons cannot be approaced rationally then they cannot be ap-
proached at all, for a democracy, with its heavy citizenship burdens, re-
quires a rational electorate.
44 Symposium - Land Planning in a Democracy, Foreword, 20 LAw & CoNTEMP. Pton. 197, 198
(1955).
45 Stone, supra note 40 at 49.
46 WooTroN, FREEDOM UNDER PLANNING 180 (1945).
47 Williams, supra note 8, at 350.
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(5) There must always be adequate judicial review at every step
of the process. In any planning program there will be temptations to take
short cuts. After all, we have been taught often enough that power cor-
rupts. It is sometimes easier to do something efficiently by infringing an-
other's freedom than by doing it in the "right way." If this means that there
must be more accessible courts and fewer jammed dockets then they must
be made available.
(6) Planners must be able and willing to plan for diversity as much
as they plan for uniformity. John Stuart Mill once said:
It is not by wearing down into uniformity all that is individual in
themselves, but by cultivating it and calling it forth, within the lim-
its imposed by the rights and interests of others, that human beings
become a noble and beautiful object of contemplation; and as the
works partake the character of those who do them, by the same proc-
ess human life also becomes rich, diversified, and animating. .... 48
Mankind speedily become unable to conceive diversity, when they have
been for some time unaccustomed to see it.4
48 MILL, op. cit. supra note 16 at 297.
49 Id. at 302.
